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onie Sharp's critical evaluation and analysis of the 
major twists and turns of the Murray Island Land 
Case (which culminated with Mabo v Queensland 
[No. 2J (1992) 175 CLR 1 in the High Court) is an impor-
tant contribution to the burgeoning literature on native 
title in Australia. As an anthropologist who has been 
involved in this case from its inception, Sharp is uniquely 
placed to give us a particular view and reading of the 
ways in which the Murray Island plaintiffs and their coun-
sel put their case for having traditional ownership of land 
recognised. The courtroom drama is the central context 
within which Sharp explores the major moments and 
turning pOints in the case, as it moved between the High 
Court and the Supreme Court of Queensland over a peri-
od of 10 years. 
Sharp frames her analysis of the Murray Island Land 
Case both in terms of the case itself, and in its relation to 
international and national debates concerning Indigenous 
land tenure. Nancy Williams' 1986 book, The Yoignu and 
Their Land: A System of Land Tenure and the Fight for Its 
Recognition, an anthropological analysis of Justice 
Blackburn's 1971 judgment on Yolgnu ownership of land 
(Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd & The Commonwealth (1971) 17 
FLR 141) is particularly important to Sharp's approach: 
'[Williams'] experience of courtroom misunder-
standings and her historical study of European concepts 
of property are distilled in this seminal study, which has 
a link with this book' (p xxi). 
The interpretation of evidence 
In this 'native title era' or 'post-Mabo era' which all 
Australians now inhabit and are continuing to construct, 
Sharp's critique of the ways in which the concepts of 
Meriam law and ownership have been consistently misun-
derstood and misrepresented in the Supreme and High 
Courts is especially pertinent. Her detailed exploration of 
the findings of justice Moynihan in the Supreme Court of 
Queensland on 16 November 1990 and the roll-on effects 
of those findings on the subsequent interpretations of 
ownership by the seven High Court judges, reminds us 
that notwithstanding their historic finding in favour of 
Murray Islanders' native title, the real meaning and prac-
tice of Meriam ownership has yet to be grasped by the 
judiciary, governments, and Australians as a whole. 
Paradoxically, while the High Court was able to overturn 
the doctrine of terra nullius by recognising the operation of 
more than one law in relation to land in Australia, this 
finding was predicated on the reduction of Meriam rela-
tions to the land to essentially economic and material rela-
tions. In the process of squeezing and diminishing 
Meriam land-people relationships into a Singular approxi-
mation of common law understandings of property, 
enabling it to become 'known to English law', the signifi-
cance and the greater meanings of Meriam relationships to 
the land have been minimalised and diffused, both during 
the case itself and in subsequent renderings of native title: 
'[W]hile most people are aware that the Meriam 
people won recognition of "native title" to their land, 
the principles of that Meriam land tenure have had little 
airing outside the Murray Islands. A difficulty is that 
few non-Aboriginal people have had the chance to lis-
ten to Meriam voices saying that there are two cate-
gories of law, more than one way of relating to land, 
more than one culture. Their declarations of their local 
principles are rarely heard because they were hidden, both 
in court and the Determination of the Issues of Fact, 
behind narrow definitions of law and ownership. In the pub-
lic arena they were diffused within the pervasive and 
taken-for-granted sense of one law and the exigencies of prac-
tical politics' (p 214; my italics). 
Central to Sharp's analysis is the problematic way in 
which evidence is heard and misinterpreted, particularly 
in the adversarial context of the Supreme Court. It is star-
tlingly evident in No Ordinary Judgment that this constitut-
ed particularly difficult terrain for Torres Strait Islander 
and non-Torres Strait Islander witnesses alike to negoti-
ate; none of course were trained in law. 
As an anthropologist working with Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people, it struck me how crucial it is 
for all of us to become as familiar with the culture of 
courtroom interrogation and the construal of meaning and 
argument, as we are with the societies within which we 
usually conduct our research. This is no easy task, but 
what is perfectly clear from Sharp's book is that what 
many witnesses were saying and meaning in the Supreme 
Court, was not necessarily understood by the judiciary. 
Making the courts understand 
Because of the way in which Justice Moynihan nar-
rowly interpreted the 'facts' of the case, the subsequent 
exploration of matters of law pertaining to the case in the 
High Court was necessarily constrained. Customary 
ownership of land (and sea), obligation and right, inclu-
sion and exclusion, the reciprocal relationships between 
people and place which are economic and spiritual, are 
yet to be properly understood by the judiciary. The sim-
plistic renderings and translations of Meriam law and 
ownership is particularly disturbing given the debates 
about traditional ownership which have proliferated 
since Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd & The Commonwealth. 
While this case did help to clarify many points of law for 
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several of the judges, enabling a positive outcome for the 
Meriam plaintiffs, nevertheless, within both of these 
landmark judgments there remains a tenacious need for 
traditional systems of law and land ownership to be 
recast, and thus misrepresented, in order to make them 
known to English law. 
As anthropologists trained in exploring the experience 
of humans as cultural and creative beings, we implicitly 
understand that the everyday slippage between on-the-
ground, observable cultural practice and the normative 
statements which inform culture, is in essence the sine qua 
non of culture. It would seem from reading Sharp's book 
that this is where she and Jeremy Beckett are at odds (see 
'The Murray Island land case and the problem of cultural 
continuity' by Jeremy Beckett in Mabo and Native Title: 
Origins and Institutional Implications by W Sanders (ed». 
Sharp iterates normative statements about Malo's Law 
regularly throughout her book, whereas when she exam-
ines snippets of Beckett's work, it is clear that he is con-
cerned with on-the-ground behaviour, and flexibility. 
As a professional group, we need to learn the language 
of lawyers. It is critically important that the judiciary 
properly comprehend and grasp the flexibility and adapt-
ability of culture. Until we successfully communicate this 
crucial dynamic of all cultures to the legal fraternity, such 
dynamism will continue to run the risk of being miscon-
strued and simplistically rendered as indicative of irre-
versible change and cultural demise, rather than signify-
ing cultural continuity. It is not until we skillfully bridge 
the cultural gap between anthropology and the law that 
such cultural 'truths' will cease to appear confusing in the 
courtroom, and instead become illuminating. 
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